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INTRODUCTION
In adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2),' Congress ac-
cepted a traditional exception to the general rule that evidence of
character is inadmissible to show that a person acted in a particular
way on a specific occasion. 2 According to the traditional view,
women who consent to nonmarital sexual intercourse possess a
"character for unchastity." 3 Under the common law and the Fed-
eral Rules, an accused rapist may therefore introduce reputation
evidence of the complainant's unchaste character to prove inferen-
tially that she consented to intercourse with the defendant on the
occasion in issue.4
Within a few months of the effective date of the Federal Rules,
however, the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the Senate Judiciary Committee reported a bill that would have
limited admissibility to situations in which specific prior acts form
"part of a pattern of sexual conduct by the victim that under the
circumstances is relevant to the issue of consent."' 5 This formula-
1 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) provides:
(a) Character evidence generally.-Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in con-
formity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(2) Character of victim.-Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the
first aggressor ....
2See 2 WEINSTEIN 404[06]. See generally McCoRMICK § 188.
3 See 1 WIGMORE § 62; Annot., 140 A.L.R. 364, 380 (1942).
4 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2), 405(a); 2 WEINSTEIN 404[06]; 1 WIGMORE §§ 62, 200.
5 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1646(b)(2)(B) (1975). As finally reported by the Subcom-
mittee this proposal would have also admitted evidence of prior sexual acts with the defen-
dant:
(b) PRooF.-Under sections 1641 through 1645 [defining certain sex offenses]:
(2) evidence relating to the victim's prior sexual conduct is not admissible
as evidence except on the issue of consent, and is not admissible on the issue
of consent unless such conduct:
(A) involved the participation of the defendant; or
(B) was part of a pattern of sexual conduct by the victim that under the
circumstances is relevant to the issue of consent.
Congress failed to take action on S. 1. Although most of the bill's provisions were rein-
troduced in S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), § 1646(b)(2) of the new bill differs sig-
nificantly from its predecessor:
(b) PROOF.-In a prosecution under section [sic] 1641 through 1645:
(2) except as otherwise required by the Constitution, evidence relating to the
victim's prior or subsequent sexual behavior is not admissible.
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tion excludes evidence of reputation, and thus departs dramat-
ically from the common-law doctrine embodied in the Federal
Rules and followed in most states. Such an approach is long over-
due. Both longstanding principles of evidentiary law and modern
conceptions of sexual morality unequivocally point to the need
for reform.
The Senate bill not only drew attention to this problem; it
also provided a sensible replacement for the traditional rule. Al-
though several states have enacted legislation that limits the com-
mon-law rule in a variety of ways,6 for presumably similar policy
The Senate has not yet taken action on this measure.
A different approach appears in a separate bill introduced in the House, which would
add a new Federal Rule of Evidence 412. See H.R. 408, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The
new Rule would provide in part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reputation or opinion evi-
dence of a person's past sexual behavior is not admissible in any trial if an issue in
such trial is whether such person was raped or assaulted with intent to commit
rape.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, evidence of specific instances
of a person's past sexual behavior is not admissible in any trial if an issue in such
trial is whether such person was raped or assaulted with intent to commit rape,
except that otherwise admissible evidence of specific instances of such conduct is
admissible in such trial-
(1) if such evidence-
(A) is evidence of sexual behavior with persons other than the
accused, offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused
was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the source of preg-
nancy, disease, semen, or injury; or
(B) is of past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by
the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to
the sexual behavior with respect to which rape or assault is alleged....
Id. To date, no action has been taken on this proposal.
6 See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(2) (West Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-
32.5-1 to 4 (Burns Supp. 1976); N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1976);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Page Supp. 1976); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13
(Vernon Supp. 1976). Nevertheless, only two of the recently enacted statutes-those of
Florida and Minnesota-adopt the pattern-of-similar-behavior formulation proposed un-
der § 1646 of S. 1 (see note 5 and accompanying text supra) and advocated in this Article.
Florida's statute provides that
when consent by the victim is at issue, .. .evidence [of specific instances of prior
consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the
defendant] may be admitted if it is first established to the court outside the pres-
ence of the jury that such activity shows such a relation to the conduct involved in
the case that it tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of
the victim which is relevant to the issue of consent.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West 1976). Similarly, when the defendant raises consent or
fabrication as a defense, Minnesota's statute allows evidence of prior acts "tending to estab-
lish a common scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct under circumstances similar to the
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reasons,7 the Senate proposal stands almost alone in defining
relevance in terms of specific patterns of behavior. 8
This standard reflects reality. Given the wide variety of possi-
ble sexual relationships in contemporary society, the nature of the
complainant's prior sexual activity, rather than its mere existence,
provides the only reliable indicator of present consent. 9 Thus,
courts should evaluate the relevance of sexual history evidence by
measuring the degree of similarity between the prior acts and the
case at issue on the part of the complainant, relevant and material to the issue of consent
or fabrication," but such evidence is admissible only if the conduct took place within one
year before the alleged offense and only to the extent that the court finds that "its inflam-
matory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.347(3) (West Supp. 1976). Several other statutes also provide for a balancing of
probative value against prejudice, but do not necessarily exclude reputation or opinion
evidence of the victim's chastity. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Page Supp.
1976); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13(a) (Vernon Supp. 1976). Under a catch-all
provision, New York apparently allows the defense to introduce opinion and reputation
evidence if the court deems it "relevant and admissible in the interests of justice." N.Y.
CRlIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(5) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
In marked contrast to S. 1, California bars all reputation evidence, opinion evi-
dence, and proof of specific acts (except when the evidence relates to sexual conduct with
the defendant), while allowing the use of such evidence, subject to certain procedural
safeguards, to impeach the victim's credibility. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(2)
(West Supp. 1977). Although S. 1 would have limited the admissibility of prior sexual
relations with the defendant to the issue of consent, the various state statutes almost uni-
formly allow the use of such evidence to impeach credibility as well. See, e.g., CAL. EvID.
CODE § 1 103(2)(b), (d) (West Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West 1976); IND.
CODE AN4. § 35-1-32.5-2(a) (Burns Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347(3)(c) (West
Supp. 1976); N.Y. CRxia. PROC. LAW § 60.42(l) (McKinney Supp. 1976). Moreover, unlike
S. 1, many of the statutes also provide explicitly for the admissibility of the complainant's
prior sexual conduct to show the source of semen, pregnancy, or disease. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.347(3)(b) (West Supp. 1976); N.Y. CRINI. PROC. LAW § 60.42(4) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1976).
For a comprehensive discussion of the state statutes with regard to both their substan-
tive and procedural provisions, see Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in
the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32-39 (1977).
7 Policies underlying reform include encouraging the victim to report the crime, pro-
tecting the victim's privacy, preventing undue harassment and humiliation, and shifting the
focus away from the victim's character-a collateral issue at best-to the commission of the
crime. See, e.g., Bellacosa, Practice Commentary to N.Y. CRIAM. PROC. LAW § 60.42, at 100
(McKinney Supp. 1976); Berger, supra note 6, at 54; Note, California Rape Evidence Re-
form: An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1554 (1975).
8 Only the Florida and Minnesota statutes take a similar approach. See note 6 supra.
9 See generally People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 690-91, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864,
866-67 (1976); Lynn v. State, 231 Ga. 559, 203 S.E.2d 221 (1974); Commonwealth v.
McKay, 363 Mass. 220, 227, 294 N.E.2d 213, 218 (1973); 3 H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 766, at 1766-67 (5th ed. 1957); Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict with the
Confrontation Clause?, 9 IND. L. REV. 418, 429-30 (1976); Note, If She Consented Once, She
Consented Again-A Legal Fallacy in Forcible Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 127, 138 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Fallacy].
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conduct alleged on the occasion in issue.' 0 This Article develops an
analytical framework for making this evaluation.
The suggested analysis allows the trier of fact to draw an in-
ference of consent from prior patterns of behavior clearly similar
to the conduct immediately in issue. The pattern of conduct would
be admissible only if there is a strong showing based on evidence of
specific acts (1) that the victim engaged in the alleged prior acts; (2)
that the pattern of conduct shares common characteristics, espe-
cially as to participants, with the incident involved in the present
case; (3) that the prior conduct is not too remote in time; (4) that
the proof is necessary to the proper presentation of the de-
fendant's case; and (5) that the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its potential prejudicial effect. This inductive approach
follows generally accepted evidentiary principles regarding the rel-
evance of prior similar occurrences, 1 and would exclude much of
the sexual history evidence still admitted under the traditional rule.
In addition to allowing the defense to present reputation evi-
dence of the complainant's unchastity to prove consent, the Federal
Rules and many states admit such evidence to impeach the com-
plainant's credibility.1 2 Wigmore, the leading proponent of the tradi-
tional doctrine, bases this rule on the assumption that unchaste
women habitually make false accusations.13 In contrast, the Senate
bill would have totally excluded evidence of sexual history-in
whatever form-when offered for purposes of impeachment.14 In
rejecting Wigmore's position, however, the proposal went too far.
Evidence of specific prior acts, when shown to be relevant under
closely circumscribed standards of similarity, should be admissible
to impeach credibility as well as to show consent.
10 See Huffman v. State, 301 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Hill,
244 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Minn. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1065 (1977).
11 See generally MCCORMICK § 200 (evidence of previous accidents and injuries in neg-
ligence and products liability cases). See also id. § 195 (evidence of habit and custom). In
discussing the admissibility of evidence of other crimes to prove criminal intent, two com-
mentators have advocated a similar approach:
As an additional factor, it must be shown that the prior acts are similar, at least
sufficiently so to allow for some probative value. Establishing requirements for
similarity will no doubt leave considerable room for difference of opinion, and
much will be left to the discretion of the individual trial judge.
Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV. 325, 328 (1956) (footnotes
omitted).
12 See 3A WIGMOaE § 924a; notes 199-206 and accompanying text infra.
" See 3A WIGMOIZE § 924a, at 736-37; 1 WIGMORE § 62, at 466-67.
14 See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
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I
UNCHASTE CHARACTER AS PROOF OF CONSENT-AN
ATTACK ON THE TRADITIONAL RULE
Since lack of consent is a necessary element of the crime of
rape, 15 the defense must be permitted to offer evidence that the
victim consented to the act.' 6 It thus becomes necessary to deter-
mine what types of evidence are admissible to prove consent. The
defendant's testimony that the complaining witness consented
would be clearly relevant and admissible. The testimony of other
witnesses relating to the woman's conduct on the occasion in ques-
tion and her immediate relationship with the defendant would also
be unobjectionable. But when the defense seeks to show consent by
offering evidence of the complainant's general reputation, signifi-
cant questions of relevance and prejudice become apparent.' 7
Acknowledging the shortcomings of character evidence, courts
have normally excluded it.18 Apparently, however, men of previ-
ous generations were so unnerved by women's accusations of sex-
ual abuse that in rape cases they departed from this general rule to
protect the accused against the wild charges of "errant young girls
and women."' 9 Thus, even when the circumstances of the alleged
crime differed completely from the woman's reputed sexual activ-
ity, her reputation, viewed as evidence of character, provided a
15 E.g., Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1954); Commonwealth v. Shrodes, 354
Pa. 70, 46 A.2d 438 (1946); 2 WEINSTEIN 404[06], at 404-35; 1 WIGMORE § 62, at 464.
"6 The defendant's due process rights to a fair trial and to confrontation of the witness-
es against him guarantee this opportunity. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; People v.
Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1976); People v. Conyers, 86 Misc. 2d
754, 382 N.Y.S.2d 437 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Berger, supra note 6, at 52-53; Comment, Linita-
tions on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior Sexual History of the Complaining
Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection of Reality or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 403, 419-25 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Limitations]. Respectively, Blackburn and Con-
yers rejected constitutional challenges to the California and New York statutes limiting a
rape defendant's opportunity to introduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual con-
duct. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(2) (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. CRI.i. PROC. LAW
§ 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1976); note 6 supra. In Conyers, the court concluded that "the
statute would have serious problems of constitutionality" if it did not, in a final catch-all pro-
vision, allow the trial judge broad discretion to admit "in the interests of justice" evidence
that the statute would otherwise exclude. 86 Misc. 2d at 763, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 444. See gen-
erally Note, Indicia of Consent? A Proposal for Change to the Common Law Rule Admitting Evidence
of a Rape Victim's Character for Chastity, 7 Loy. CH. L.J. 118, 129-34 (1976) (constitutional
implications of proposal limiting content of rape defense) [hereinafter cited as Indicia].
17 See notes 64-76 and accompanying text infra.
18 See, e.g., McCoRNICK § 188.
19 3A WIGMORE § 924a, at 736.
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sufficient basis for the inference of present consent.20
This approach maximized the scope and effect of sexual his-
tory evidence in rape cases. The trier of fact was not permitted to
draw the inference of consent directly from specific acts forming
the complainant's sexual history, since a significant dissimilarity
between past and present circumstances would have exploded the
inference. 21 The traditional doctrine avoided this obstacle by re-
casting sexual history into a character trait.22 This approach com-
ported with a basic evidentiary principle: inferences may be drawn
from character, but generally not from specific prior acts.2 3 Thus,
the traditional doctrine allowed the factfinder to draw an inference
of unchaste character from a reputation for prior sexual activity,24
and then permitted an inference of present consent from the char-
acter thus established.25 Under the traditional view, the character
of the complainant in a rape case is not directly in issue, as it might
be in a seduction case. 26 The concept of character takes on signifi-
cance only as a vital step in the inferential process leading to proof
of consent.
Proponents of the traditional view assume that all nonmarital
intercourse is abnormal, immoral, and reprehensible. 27 If this as-
sumption is false, the doctrine must fall. Research conducted over
the past thirty years indicates that most young women now engage
in premarital sexual relationships.2 8 Contemporary society gener-
ally considers such behavior normal.29 With this change in prevail-
ing behavior and attitudes, the mere presence of nonmarital sexual
20 See notes 33-40 and accompanying text infra.
21 See notes 88-95 and accompanying text infra.
22 See 1 WIGMORE § 62.
23 See id. at 467.
24 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2), 405(b) & Advisory Committee's Note; 2 WEINSTEIN
404[06], 405[04]; 1 WIGMORE §§ 62, 200; Annot., 140 A.L.R. 364, 380-90 (1942).
2' See generally 1 WIGMORE § 192.
26 E.g., Burrow v. State, 166 Ark. 138, 265 S.W. 642 (1924); State v. Wilcoxen, 200
Iowa 1250, 206 N.W. 260 (1925). See Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 404; 1
WIGMORE §§ 79, 205.
27 See, e.g., State v. Wood, 59 Ariz. 48, 122 P.2d 416 (1942); People v. Abbot, 19 Wend.
192 (N.Y. 1838); Lee v. State, 132 Tenn. 655, 179 S.W. 145 (1915). See generally Note, supra
note 7, at 1551 n.3; Fallacy, supra note 9, at 150-51.
28 See notes 41-55 and accompanying text infra. One recent study showed that 65% of
the sample of unmarried college women were nonvirgins. See Oswalt, Sexual and Contracep-
tive Behavior of College Females, 22 AM. C. HEALTH A.J. 392 (1974). See also R. SORENSON,
ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 121-22 (1973) (45% of females aged
13-19 had experienced intercourse). See generally Limitations, supra note 16, at 413-14;
Fallacy, supra note 9, at 141-43.20See, e.g., M. HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970's 116 (1974).
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experience provides no basis for inferring a specific character
"trait" predictive of present consent. In short, sexual history is
"character-neutral."
In addition to its failure to reflect this change in social norms,
the traditional doctrine ignores basic principles of relevance long
recognized in other contexts. Instead of admitting only the par-
ticularized proof normally required to connect general assump-
tions of probability with the specific event in question,30 the tradi-
tional rule allows juries to speculate about consent on the basis of a
tortured series of inferences grounded on unreliable reputation
evidence. 31 Furthermore, the traditional doctrine fails to take into
account the unfair prejudice and confusion likely to result from
admission of sexual history evidence. These dangers will often far
outweigh the probative value of such evidence. 32
In short, the traditional rule is wrong. It proceeds from a
faulty premise and contravenes principles and policies long em-
bodied in the law of evidence.
A. The Foundation of the Traditional Rule Crumbles
Traditionalists argue that evidence of the complainant's un-
chastity is always relevant when the defendant raises the issue of
consent. 33 Wigmore states that "the character of the woman as
to chastity is of considerable probative value in judging the likeli-
hood of [her] consent. '34 The traditionalists reach this conclusion
through a specious form of deductive reasoning: moral judgments
as to character give rise to a universal premise from which a con-
clusion is drawn in each particular case.35 In operation, the logic
30 See generally People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968)
(en banc); Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945); Ball, The Mo-
ment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REv. 807, 812-13 (1961);
James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689, 697-700 (1941); Tribe,
Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1346
(1971). Cf. United States v. Cavazos, 530 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting use of probability
statistics in sentencing).
31 See, e.g., State v. Wulff, 194 Minn. 271, 260 N.W. 515 (1935). See generally 1
WIGMoRE §§ 62, 200.
" See Fallacy, supra note 9, at 149-61; notes 64-76, 97-107 and accompanying text infra.
See generally FED. R. EVID. 403.
33 See, e.g., 2 WEINSTEIN 404(06]; 1 WIGMORE § 62.
34 1 WiGMORE § 62, at 464. See Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvID. 404; 2
WEINSTEIN 404[06].
35 In contrast, the analysis proposed in this Article relies on an inductive approach.
This involves reasoning from evidence of specific prior acts to a conclusion regarding the
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proceeds as follows:
Major Premise: Women who possess the character trait of un-
chastity consent more readily than chaste women to sexual
intercourse.
Minor Premise: The complainant's reputation establishes that
she possesses the character trait of unchastity.
Conclusion: The complainant's character trait of unchastity
makes her consent more likely than if she lacked this trait.3 6
This conclusion seems to accord with a basic evidentiary rule: evi-
dence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a
material fact more or less probable. 37 The conclusion is invalid,
however, because it proceeds from a faulty major premise. This
premise springs from the moral judgment that women who engage
in nonmarital intercourse are "immoral," and that such immoral
women are more likely to consent to nonmarital intercourse on any
given occasion. Once the woman's immorality is established, albeit
by character evidence, the factfinder may infer consent not from
her specific pattern of behavior, but rather from her membership
in the class of women with a reputation for unchastity.38
That the traditional reasoning employs a concept of character
heavily laden with moral bias39 is hardly surprising, for character
evidence by its nature reflects moral predilections. Each person
probability of a similar occurrence in the present case. See notes 134-37 and accompanying
text infra.
3 6 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 106 Cal. 289, 39 P. 622 (1895); People v. Collins, 25 Ill.
2d 605, 186 N.E.2d 30 (1962).
The following is a typical jury instruction employing this deductive analysis:
Evidence was received for the purpose of showing that the female person
named in the information was a woman of unchaste character.
A woman of unchaste character can be the victim of a forcible rape but it may
be inferred that a woman who has previously consented to sexual intercourse
would be more likely to consent again.
Such evidence may be considered by you only for such bearing as it may have
on the question of whether or not she gave her consent to the alleged sexual act
and in judging her credibility.
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL 10.06 (3d ed. 1970). For a discussion of the tra-
ditional rape instruction and its historical antecedents, see People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal.
3d 864, 873-77, 538 P.2d 247, 254-56, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 126-28 (1975); Berger, supra note
6, at 10, 96-97. An increasing number of jurisdictions are abandoning the special charge
in rape cases, through either legislative reform or judicial decision. See id. at 11 & n.75.
37 FED. R. EvIo. 401; MCCORMICK § 185, at 437. See notes 78-87 and accompanying
text infra.
38 See Limitations, supra note 16, at 414-16.
39See Note, supra note 7, at 1551 n.3; Limitations, supra note 16, at 403 n.3, 407. See
generally Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvID. 405.
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exhibits some character traits society applauds and others it con-
demns. Character is measured by the degree of conformity to the
prevailing customs or standards of the culture. Thus, character
analysis begins with a general formulation of the traits society
favors, proceeds to determine whether some individual is reputed
to possess those traits, and then infers particular action on a par-
ticular occasion from the "character" previously "proved." This
process relies on both a moral presumption and a complex series of
inferences. The immorality of the complainant in a rape case was
deemed relevant because it was viewed as the functional equivalent
of character. The moral beliefs of individual judges thus became
the standard for determining the admissibility of the complainant's
sexual history.
Under the traditional doctrine, these moral judgments were
purportedly applied not in any religious or ethical sense, but
purely as a basis for logical inference; prior immoral acts estab-
lished a disposition or propensity to engage in further immoral
acts. 40 If these moral notions are removed, however, the specific
acts previously forced into the background take on the significance
they should have had all along. The question then becomes
whether the prior acts have probative value in determining the
likelihood that the later acts occurred.
In a society that no longer considers nonmarital sexual be-
havior immoral or even unusual, there can be no immoral charac-
ter trait of unchastity; thus, there can be no character-based pre-
sumption that unchaste women consent more readily than chaste
women to a given sexual act. Common acceptance of nonmarital
sexual activity undermines the foundation of the traditional rule.
Unchastity is no longer "immoral"; it is character-neutral.
A less theoretical explanation of the traditional rule lies in the
antipathy of previous generations toward those perceived as "im-
moral." In a society that favored and professed to practice chastity,
women who engaged in sexual activity outside the conjugal bed
were deemed unworthy of either protection or belief. Present per-
ceptions of sexual morality obviously undermine this 'justification"
for the traditional rule.
Longstanding beliefs about the sexual attitudes and practices
of American women began to crumble with the publication of the
famous Kinsey Report in 1953. 4 1 The Report showed that nearly
40 See 1 WIGMORE §§ 62, 192, 200; 3A WIGMORE § 924a.
41 A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN, & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
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50% of the women interviewed who had married by age 20 had en-
gaged in premarital intercourse. 42 The same percentage held for
women married between the ages of 21 and 25.4 3 Among women
married between the ages of 26 and 30, between 40% and 66% had
experienced premarital sex. 44 Of the married women who had en-
gaged in premarital relations, 77% saw no reason to regret the ex-
perience.45 Of the unmarried women, 69% expressed a similar at-
titude.4 6
More recent research indicates that female sexual attitudes
and practices are substantially more liberal today than a mere gen-
eration ago. 47 Moreover, the research also demonstrates that male
attitudes toward female sexual behavior do not accord with the
common-law view that most men scorn the "unchaste" woman.48 A
recent study, published by Morton Hunt in 1974, 49 showed that by
age 24, 70% of the unmarried women in the sample had experi-
enced intercourse, and 80% of the married women had engaged in
premarital relations. 50 The study also showed that 68% of all the
women interviewed condoned premarital sex for women and 73%
condoned it for men.51 Of the men, a remarkable 81% accepted
HUMAN FEMALE (1953) [hereinafter cited as KINSEY]. See also A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, & C.
MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948).
Kinsey based his findings on a sample of 5,940 white females whose case histories were
completed prior to 1950. KINSEY, supra, at 22, 43. The case histories were supplemented
by substantial additional data. Id. at 3, 22; P. ROBINSON, THE MODERNIZATION OF SEX 99-100
(1976).
For a historical overview of sexual research from the Victorian era to the present, with
particular emphasis on the work of Havelock Ellis, Alfred Kinsey, and William Masters and
Virginia Johnson, see P. ROBINSON, supra. For a compilation of statistical materials resulting
from this research, see V. PACKARD, THE SEXUAL WILDERNESS 491-511 (1968).
42 KINSEY, supra note 41, at 287.
43 Id.
44Id.
45 Id. at 316. The study also showed that by age 40, some 26% of the married women
had engaged in extramarital relationships. Id. at 416.
46 Id. at 316. One historian of sexual research has described the importance of Kinsey's
work in the following terms:
One can . . . sense Kinsey's influence in the increasing tolerance with which
the sexual activities of the young, especially the unmarried young, are contem-
plated .... [T]his liberalizing influence has stemmed in part from a simple empir-
ical discovery, namely that a great deal of sexual activity, among young and old
alike, occurs outside marriage.
P. ROBINSON, supra note 41, at 117.
11 See, e.g., M. HUNT, supra note 29, at 20, 149-55; V. PACKARD, supra note 41, passimt.
18 See M. HUNT, supra note 29, at 114-20.
49 M. HUNT, supra note 29.
50 Id. at 150.
51 Id. at 116, Table 13. These figures represent women's views on premarital sex for
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premarital sex for women, and 84% accepted it for men.51
Statistical studies of the sexual activities and attitudes of
American men and women date back to the time of World War I.53
They consistently demonstrate that substantial and growing ma-
jorities of the adult population have engaged in and condone sex-
ual relationships that the common-law doctrine would condemn as
immoral.54 If these studies are accurate, the majority of American
"engaged" couples. For couples described as "in love," 61% of the female sample condoned
premarital sex for women, 68% for men. Id.
s52 Id. These figures reflect men's views on premarital sex for "engaged" couples. For
couples described as "in love," 77% of the male sample condoned premarital sex for
women, 82% for men. Id.
Sexual attitudes were also explored in a recent poll of 530 Long Island boys and girls
between the ages of 13 and 18. See Newsday, Mar. 30, 1976, at 3A. Some 64% believed
that cohabitation before marriage was acceptable behavior, and 55% approved of sexual
relations among high-school teenagers. Id.
5
' See V. PACKARD, supra note 41, at 492-503.
'4 See id. at 135-46, 492-503.
The studies conducted before 1920 showed a marked disagreement on the sexual ex-
perience of American women. One researcher concluded that as early as 1919, 26% of the
women sampled between the ages of 20 and 29 had engaged in premarital sex. L. TERMAN,
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN MARITAL HAPPINESS 321, Table 113 (1938). Other data from
the same period, however, indicated that only 7% to 14% of the women sampled had
experienced premarital relations. K. DAvis, FACTORS IN THE SEX LIFE OF TWENTY-Two
HUNDRED WOMEN 20 (1929); KINSEY, supra note 41, at 339, Table 83.
During the 1920's, researchers generally found a marked increase in sexual behavior.
Their calculations of the incidence of premarital relations among women who had reached
the age of 25 ranged between 36% and 49%. See G. HAMILTON, RESEARCH IN MARRIAGE
384 (1929); KINSEY, supra note 41, at 339, Table 83; L. TERMAN, supra, at 321, Table 113.
Although the studies in the 1930's again showed divergent results, they revealed a
definite upward trend in premarital sexual activity. See D. BROMLEY & F. BRITTON, YOUTH
AND SEX 289, Table 7 (1938); PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1946, at 481-82 (H. Cantril ed. 1951);
KINSEY, supra note 41, at 339, Table 83; L. TERMAN, supra, at 321, Table 113. Research for
this period showed that at least 39% of the women sampled had experienced premarital
relations. KINSEY, supra note 41, at 339, Table 83. In one study, a sample of 666 married
couples showed that 47% of the women and 68% of the men had had premarital sexual
experience. E. BURGESS & P. WALLIN, ENGAGEMENT AND MARRIAGE 330, Table 28 (1950).
The Terman study, typically yielding the highest percentages in this regard, found that
68% of the women and 86% of the men sampled had engaged in premarital sex by age 20.
L. TERMAN, supra, at 321, Table 113.
Research conducted abroad during these periods also demonstrated significant and
increasing levels of premarital sexual activity. V. PACKARD, supra note 41, at 495-500. In
England, for example, the percentage of women who have had premarital relations by age
20 has ranged from 19% in the period before 1904 to 43% in 1954. E. CHESSER, SEXUAL,
MARITAL AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS OF ENGLISH WOMEN 311, Table 276 (1956). A study in
West Germany revealed that about 70% of the women and 89% of the men interviewed
had experienced premarital sex. W. GOODE, WORLD REVOLUTION AND FAMILY PATTERNS 36
(1963). Research conducted in East Germany in 1967 showed that by age 20, 78% of the
women and 83.5% of the men had engaged in premarital relations. V. PACKARD, supra
note 41, at 496. A study in Sweden revealed that by age 18, 46% of the girls and 57% of
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adults possess the character trait of unchastity.5 5 Thus, even if this
concept remains useful for religious or ethical purposes, sexual
activity outside of marriage is so widespread that it provides no
basis for inferring sexual conduct in a specific instance. For pur-
poses of the law of evidence, the concept of character for unchas-
tity no longer has a moral foundation.
B. Shortcomings of the Character Concept
Evidence of a person's character is generally inadmissible to
prove that he or she acted in a specific way on a particular oc-
casion.5 6 At least three sound reasons support this rule. First, as
suggested above, character evidence necessarily reflects moral
judgments. 57 Second, such evidence may simply allow the jury to
give vent to their prejudices and hostilities.5 8 Third, character evi-
dence can easily distract the jury from the true issues in the case.
The drafters of the Federal Rules clearly recognized these dangers:
Character evidence .... tends to distract the trier of fact
from the main question of what actually happened on the par-
ticular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the
good man and to punish the bad man because of their respective
characters despite what the evidence in the case shows actually
happened. 59
the boys had engaged in nonmarital sex. B. LINNER, SEX AND SOCIETY IN SWEDEN 19-20
(1967). Another study of students aged 17-24 showed an increase in those experiencing
intercourse from 72% in 1960 to 81% in 1965; the rise among women was especially
dramatic-from 40% to 65%-during this period. Id. at 19. Yet another Swedish study
showed that among a sample of married women between the ages of 16 and 50, 80% had
engaged in premarital sex. Id. at 18-19. In Denmark, one study found that 97% of the
women had experienced sex before marriage. V. PACKARD, supra note 41, at 496.
55 It should be noted that Kinsey's samples were limited to the white population of
the United States. KINSEY, supra note 41, at 4, 27, 35. Later research includes all racial
groups, and is consistent with Kinsey's earlier findings. See, e.g., M. HUNT, supra note 29,
at 16-17, 146-52.
Although it might be said that a majority of American adults possess the "character
trait" of unchastity, this concept appears to be totally inappropriate when applied to ado-
lescents. One commentator has noted:
... [Elven if one could hypothesize a unitary trait for chastity that determines
behavior in particular cases, one might be slow to apply the concept to young per-
sons, whose "characters" are still fluid. Studies have shown that victims of rape are
by and large extremely youthful; more than half are under twenty; three-quarters
under twenty-six.
Berger, supra note 6, at 21.
5 6 See MCCORMICK § 188.
57 See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
58 See MCCORMICK §§ 186, 188.
59 Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvID. 404 (quoting CAL. LAW REVISION
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Thus, admission of character evidence subtly undermines the
adversary system. The system's purpose is to settle discrete disputes
between litigants by discovering the facts of the incident in ques-
tion and applying legal principles to those facts. It does not ex-
amine the parties' lives in an effort to reward the morally worthy
and to scorn the unworthy.
Despite these drawbacks, the Federal Rules of Evidence admit
evidence of character to prove consent. Rule 404(a) states the gen-
eral proposition that evidence of a person's character is not admis-
sible to prove that he or she acted "in conformity therewith" on any
particular occasion. 60 Rule 404(a)(2), however, recognizes the com-
mon-law exception with respect to the character of the victim. 61
The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 404 indicates that the
question of consent does not put the complainant's character di-
rectly in issue.6 2 Rather, proof of character on the question of
consent is inferential and is permissible only by reputation or opin-
ion evidence under Rule 405(a), rather than by evidence of specific
acts under Rule 405(b). 63
C. Shortcomings of Reputation Evidence
The creation of the "class" of unchaste women is disingenuous.
Even worse is the type of evidence the common law and the Fed-
eral Rules admit to establish membership in that class. Since
character evidence has been viewed with suspicion, 64 restrictions on
its introduction abound.65 These restrictions result from the rec-
ognition that proof of character involves inherent dangers of re-
CONMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELATING TO
THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 615 (1964)). See also Berger, supra note 6, at 19-20.
60 FED. R. EVID. 404(a), set out in relevant part in note 1 supra.
61 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2), set out in note 1 supra; 2 WEINSTEIN 404[06].
62 Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 404.
63 FED. R. EVID. 405 provides:
(a) Reputation or opinion.-In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait
of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, in-
quiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct.-In cases in which character or a trait of char-
acter of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may
also be made of specific instances of his conduct.
64 See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477-80 (1948); Falknor, Extrinsic
Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 574, 585 (1956).65 See FED. R. EVID. 405 & Advisory Committee's Note; MCCORMICK § 186. See generally
2 WEINSTEIN 405[01]-[04].
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moteness, prejudice, and confusion. 66
Thus, different rules have evolved as to the manner of proof,
depending on the evidentiary purpose of the offer. If it is an
ultimate issue in the case, character may be shown by evidence of
specific acts, and, in some jurisdictions, by opinion and reputation
evidence. 67 When character is only circumstantially significant,
however, courts in nonrape cases frequently reject the offer of
proof altogether.6 8 When permitted, presentation is usually limited
to evidence of reputation.69
This approach may lessen the dangers of jury confusion and
prejudice, but the price paid in terms of reliability is high indeed. 70
Under the traditional method of introducing reputation evidence,
the lawyer asks the witness about his connection with the commu-
nity and whether he has spoken to others about the subject's repu-
tation for the specific trait in question. The lawyer then elicits the
witness's statement concerning the subject's reputation. 71 At best,
this evidence proves what the community allegedly believes, not
what the person is. 72 At worst, such proof is vague and composed
only of rumor and hearsay.73 Thus, the United States Supreme
Court has criticized rules allowing use of reputation evidence to
establish character as "illogical, unscientific, and anomalous, ex-
plainable only as archaic survivals of compurgation," opening a
"veritable Pandora's box of irresponsible gossip, innuendo and
smear."
74
Reputation evidence is particularly unreliable when it relates
to sexual matters. Sex lends itself to sensationalism and exaggera-
tion. Moreover, since sexual activity is usually private, one's sexual
reputation generally reflects little more than speculation. 75 Most
66 See FED. R. EVID. 403 & Advisory Committee's Note; McCORMICK §§ 185, 188.
67 MCCORMICK § 187. See FED. R. EVID. 405 & Advisory Committee's Note.
68 See MCCORMICK § 188.
69 Id. § 186. See Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EviD. 405.
70 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477-80 (1948).
71 See id. at 477-78; MCCORMICK § 44, at 90; Berger, supra note 6, at 59 n.347.
72 "The evidence which the law permits is not as to the personality of defendant but
only as to the shadow his daily life has cast in his neighborhood." Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469, 477 (1948).
73 See id.
71 Id. at 475 n.5 (quoting 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 433 (1964)), 480.
5 See generally Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EV1D. 405; 7 WIGMORE § 1986.
"Moreover, '[i]n a mobile, sexually active society,' there may sometimes be 'no such thing as
a "reputation for unchastity"'. The only knowledge of the victim's life will be held by her
and a few other people, not by some hypothetical 'community.'" Berger, supra note 6, at
63 (footnote omitted) (quoting B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, & S. Ross, SEX
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important, normal social processes tending to ensure that "the
truth will out" are ineffective to offset such exaggeration and
speculation. Because people value privacy, it is unlikely that a
woman who is rumored to be promiscuous will seek to correct the
record by detailing the true facts of her sex life. Moreover, provid-
ing the complainant with an opportunity to do so at trial fails to
solve the problem. In effect, this puts the victim on trial, thus
obscuring ultimate issues, and inviting a verdict based on the
jurors' personal notions of morality.7 6
D. Relevance and Prejudice
Because Federal Rule 404(a) embraces the traditional rule, the
offer of sexual reputation evidence necessitates a twofold inquiry.
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any ten-
dency to make a material fact more or less probable. Rule 403
allows the judge to exclude evidence "if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury.177 These Rules pose two es-
sential questions: Is the evidence of the complainant's unchastity
relevant to the question of consent in this case? If so, does the
possibility of prejudice or confusion substantially outweigh the
probative value of the evidence?
1. Relevance
Relevancy lies in the logical nexus between the proffered evi-
dence and the material fact it is offered to prove. 78 This relation-
ship cannot be derived by applying mechanical tests set out in
evidence codes or constructed by the common law. 79 The "any
tendency" criterion of Rule 401 serves as only a general guideline
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 839-40 (1975)). See Limitations, supra note 16, at 411-12.
76See McLean v. United States, 377 A.2d 74 (D.C. 1977).
We deem a woman's reputation for unchastity to be of very slight probative value
since it is neither relevant to her credibility as a witness, nor material on the issue
whether on the occasion of the alleged crime she consented or was forced to sub-
mit to an act of sexual intercourse .... The reputation of a woman for unchastity
raises unnecessary collateral issues which are nearly impossible to rebut, it diverts
the jury's attention from the principal issues at trial and it results in prejudice to
the complaining witness which greatly outweighs its extremely limited probative
value.
Id. at 79 (footnote omitted).
7 FED. R. EvID. 403.
7 8 See Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 401; MCCORMICK § 185; 1
WEINSTEIN 401[01]; James, supra note 30, at 690.
79 1 WEINSTEIN 401[01], at 401-7. See MCCORMICK § 185, at 438.
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rather than a strict standard.8 0 Its inclusion in Rule 401 indicates
that the Federal Rules adopted the concept of "logical relevance"
rather than "legal relevance."8' The former concept simply re-
quires the trial judge to use his practical experience and under-
standing of human affairs to determine if proof of fact A makes
material fact B more or less probable than it would be without the
proof.8 2 "Legal relevance," on the other hand, requires more for
purposes of admissibility than "any tendency" or mere probabil-
ity.8 3 This standard requires "a generally higher degree of proba-
tive value ... than would be asked in ordinary reasoning. '8 4 The
inference to be drawn from the evidence must be "highly prob-
able"8 5 or must "rest upon reasonable certainty or preponderating
probability."8 6 The legal relevance standard is undesirable because
it confuses sufficiency of the evidence, a concept related to the
overall burden of proof, with probative value, a concept related to
threshold admissibility.8 7 Logical relevance provides the appro-
priate test. It cannot, however, be applied in a vacuum. The prof-
fered evidence and the inference it supports must be logically re-
lated within a particular factual context.
If a defendant seeks to prove present consent (fact B) based
upon prior similar relations between the victim and defendant (fact
A), a direct logical relationship exists between facts A and B. The
identity of persons and similarity of conduct, although not conclu-
sive of present consent, meet the standard of logical relevance.
Evidence of prior sexual activity between the defendant and the
victim under dissimilar circumstances also has logical relevance,
although the sufficiency of this evidence is more questionable. 8
When both identity of persons and similarity of circumstances are
removed, however, probative value all but disappears. Prior con-
sent to relations with another man under different circumstances is
so tenuously related to present consent with the defendant that
evidence of the prior consent should be excluded as irrelevant.
Courts have nevertheless admitted proof of prior consent
80See 1 WEINSTEIN 1 401[01].
81 Id. 401[06]. See MCCORMICK §§ 184, 185.
82 See McCORMICK § 185, at 438; 1 WEINSTEIN 401[06].
83 See MCCORMICK § 185; 1 WIGMORE § 28.
84 1 WIGMORE § 28, at 409 (emphasis omitted).
85 People v. Nitzberg, 287 N.Y. 183, 187, 38 N.E.2d 490, 493 (1941).
86 Engel v. United Traction Co., 203 N.Y. 321,323, 96 N.E. 731, 732 (1911).
87 I WEINSTEIN 401[06]. See MCCORMICK § 185, at 437.
88 See notes 162-64 and accompanying text infra. Conversely, where the prior conduct
involves similar circumstances but different persons, evidence of a pattern of behavior may
be relevant. See notes 166-67 and accompanying text infra.
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without regard either to identity of persons or to similarity of cir-
cumstances. In nonrape cases, many courts would exclude such
evidence on the theory that it requires the factfinder to pile infer-
ence upon infer'ence without direct support for any of these infer-
ences, much less the conclusion to which they supposedly lead.8 9
The evidence is simply too remote.
Probability evidence always raises the question of remote-
ness. 90 Evidence regarding a class of objects or behavior should be
admissible only when it is possible to reason logically from the class
to the individual case. 91 Probability evidence, absent individualized
proof adequately connecting it with the instant case, is inadmissible
because it invites speculation by the jury.92
In rape cases, the traditional reasoning "calculates" the prob-
ability of consent with respect to the entire class of unchaste
women. 93 This class is composed of wholly unrelated members,
except for their single common characteristic of having consented
to nonmarital intercourse. To find any relationship among mem-
bers of the class, consent must be viewed as fungible--consent is
consent is consent. From the generalized fact of prior consent at
various times under a variety of circumstances, this view permits
the inference that a class member is more likely than a nonclass
member to consent to a particular act on a particular occasion. This
view of probabilities, the traditionalists argue, makes evidence of
unchastity "relevant" under the technical definition of that term.94
Human behavior is too complex and variable to permit such
simple-minded generalization. The class designation underlying
the traditional doctrine fails to consider the infinite variety of cir-
cumstances involved in consent to sexual intercourse. Absent the
notion that consents are fungible, the traditional analysis col-
lapses.95
Moreover, if modern sexual research is to be credited, the class
of the unchaste includes a majority of American females. 96 Since
89 See, e.g., Shutt v. State, 233 Ind. 169, 117 N.E.2d 892 (1954); People v. Razezicz, 206
N.Y. 249, 99 N.E. 557 (1912); Annot., 95 A.L.R. 162 (1935). But see I WIG~ioRE § 41.
90 See authorities cited in note 30 supra.
91 See James, supra note 30, at 697-700.
92 See, e.g., Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 912 (2d
Cir.) (economic data offered to prove antitrust damages excluded as susceptible to exag-
geration through "prejudice and hasty reasoning") (quoting 1 WIGNIORE § 28, at 409), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962).
93 See notes 33-38 and accompanying text supra.
94 See Limitations, supra note 16, at 412-17; Indicia, supra note 16, at 123-25.
95 See Note, supra note 9, at 430.
96 See notes 41-55 and accompanying text supra.
1977]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
it is impossible to infer that any specific member of this class is
more likely to consent under the particular circumstances of the
case, it is also impossible to conclude that the complainant is more
likely to have consented. Individualized proof of probability is
lacking.
2. Prejudice and Confusion
As pointed out above, proof of character traits based on repu-
tation evidence is fraught with dangers of confusion and prejudice.
Such proof centers on collateral issues imbued with moral over-
tones. 97 Moreover, the dangers of prejudice and confusion are par-
ticularly acute when chastity is at issue. 98
Since the victim is not the defendant, however, courts until
recently have refused to consider the prejudice that admission of
sexual history evidence may arouse. 99 Yet inquiries into prejudice
should be similar regardless of who submits the challenged evi-
dence.' 00 Federal Rule 403 draws no distinctions among witnesses
or parties in allowing exclusion of prejudicial evidence. 10' If its
probative value is marginal, there is good reason to exclude "[e]vi-
dence that appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of hor-
ror, provokes its instinct to punish, or triggers other mainsprings
of human action."'01 2 Evidence of prior sexual activity might well
satisfy all of these descriptions.
Evidence of a criminal defendant's general propensity to
commit crime is uniformly inadmissible on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, and lack of probative value.' 0 Yet the rape victim is
"tried" on similar general propensity evidence relating to her
"See notes 64-74 and accompanying text supra.
'8 See notes 75-76 and accompanying text supra.
" See, e.g., 3A WIGMORE § 921, at 724. For a discussion of recent cases recognizing the
dangers of prejudice and confusion, see notes 168-74 and accompanying text infra. For
recent statutory developments, see note 6 supra.
110 See McLean v. United States, 377 A.2d 74 (D.C. 1977), quoted in note 76 supra. Cf.
United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (evidence of robbery vic-
tim's homosexuality offered to prove bias rejected as ambiguous and prejudicial).
101 One basis for distinguishing between offers made by the prosecution and those
made by the defense is the need for protecting the defendant's constitutional right to a full
and fair presentation of his case. See note 16 and accompanying text supra. However, this
should certainly not foreclose courts entirely from excluding evidence offered by the de-
fendant.
102 1 WEINSTEIN 403[03], at 403-15 to 16 (footnotes omitted).
03 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) & Advisory Committee's Note; MCCoRsICK § 190; 1
WIGMORE § 57.
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unchastity. 10 4 Indeed, some theorists view character for unchastity
in terms of propensity. 10 5 While failing to note the diversity of the
"class" of the unchaste, they argue that women who engage in
nonmarital intercourse have a propensity for doing so, and that
this propensity has predictive value. 10 6 This theory merely substi-
tutes propensity for unchastity. The fatal lack of connection from
the class to the individual remains. Moreover, the theory disre-
gards the well-established rule that propensity evidence is generally
inadmissible. 10 7
E. A Hypothetical Example
Emotional reactions and moral judgments pervade the tradi-
tional analysis of sexual history evidence. A comparison with the
analysis applied to analogous evidence offered in a nonrape case
may therefore provide a useful method of evaluating the tradi-
tional rule. An examination of how character evidence is treated in
other contexts also serves to reveal the intellectual hypocrisy of
Wigmore and his fellow traditionalists. Most important, it provides
a useful summary of the arguments already raised in this Article.
Consider the following hypothetical. X has been indicted for
perjury in answering questions propounded by a Senate committee
investigating subversion. At the hearing X was asked if he voted
for Z, the Fascist Party candidate in the presidential election of
1968. He replied that he did not. The prosecution wishes to offer
evidence that in 1960, X was reputed to be a member of the Fascist
Party. The prosecution's theory is that X's reputed membership
tends to make his vote for Z in 1968 more likely than it would be
without the evidence.
Several problems are involved in this offer of proof. First, the
evidence of X's party membership eight years prior to the event is
unreliable. Second, even if the reputation of membership accords
with fact, the fact itself is remote in time. Third, there is no indi-
vidualized proof that party membership relates to voting choice in
1960, let alone 1968. Fourth, there is no connection between the
candidates for office in 1960 and 1968. Fifth, there is no evidence
of X's voting conduct at any time. Sixth, the evidence may motivate
the jury to decide the case on the ground of hostility alone.
10 4 See generally Berger, supra note 6, at 12-15.
105 See, e.g., Limitations, supra note 16, at 409 & n.28.
1
0 See id. at 409-10, 416-17.
107 See generally FED. R. EVID. 404; MCCORMICK § 190.
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On these facts, Wigmore and other authorities would likely
exclude the evidence of party membership on grounds of both
relevance and prejudice. Yet where analogous evidence is offered
to prove consent in a rape case, most authorities would admit it.108
These authorities would permit the inference of consent from the
generalized notion of character without connection of the alleged
prior consent to the instant facts.' 0 9 Thus, the lack of relation
between the prior alleged consent and the present case is no bar to
its admissibility, 0 nor is the inherent prejudice to the victim.,"
If a general "class" of activities is to provide the basis for infer-
ring consent, the generalized data should be the victim's own sex-
ual history. This reasoning would involve but one inferential step.
Reasoning from the actions of "unchaste" women generally, how-
ever, stands several steps away from the ultimate issue in the case.
The traditional doctrine not only indulges in such reasoning, but
also bars judgments based on specific past acts of the complain-
ant."
12
II
PATTERNS OF CONDUCT AS PROOF OF CONSENT-
REFORM OF THE TRADITIONAL RULE
The rape defendant has the right to introduce relevant evi-
dence on the question of consent. If, as suggested above, reputa-
tion evidence of unchastity should be excluded as irrelevant, unre-
liable, and prejudicial, a key question remains: What, if any, sexual
history evidence should be admitted to prove consent? Extending
standard evidentiary rules regarding prior similar acts and occur-
rences 13 to rape cases would permit admission of the complain-
ant's prior sexual activities if they formed a pattern of behavior
similar to the facts of the incident in issue." 4 Although at first
glance this test might appear to expand the scope of admissibility,
it is in fact a limitation. The well-established doctrine permitting
108 See notes 33-38 and accompanying text supra.
109 See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
110 See, e.g., Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1953).
" See generally Berger, supra note 6, at 12-15, 41-52.
112 See FED. R. EVID. 405 & Advisory Committee's Note; McCORMICK § 186; 1 WIG-
MORE § 200.
"3 See generally McCoRMIcK §§ 195, 200.
114 In essence, the proposal in S. 1 and two state statutes adopt this formulation. See
notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text supra.
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proof of prior similar conduct is closely circumscribed., 15 Properly
applied, the doctrine requires clear and convincing proof that the
previous acts occurred; 116 a careful comparison of the prior acts
with present circumstances, especially with regard to factors of
similarity and remoteness; 1 7 a clear showing of relevance to a ma-
terial issue;" 8 a showing of necessity;" 9 and a weighing of prej-
udice against probative value.' 20
115 See MCCORMICK §§ 186-188, 190; 1 WIGMORE §§ 192-194.
116 See United States v. Beechum, 555 F.2d 487, 492-98 (5th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Jardan, 552 F.2d 216,
218-19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2982 (1977); United States v. Davis, 551 F.2d 233,
234-35 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2197 (1977); United States v. Adderly, 592 F.2d
1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183, 1197 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); United States v. Cavallino, 498 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th
Cir. 1974).
117 See United States v. Beechum, 555 F.2d 487, 495-96 (5th Cir. 1977) (evidence of
prior crime to show intent); United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1045-48 (5th Cir. 1977)
(evidence of subsequent crime to show identity); United States v. Nolan, 551 F.2d 266, 271
(10th Cir. 1977) (evidence of prior conviction to show intent and knowledge); United
States v. Jardan, 552 F.2d 216, 218-19 (8th Cir.) (evidence of prior crime to show intent),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2982 (1977); United States v. Davis, 551 F.2d 233, 234 (8th Cir.) (ev-
idence of prior crimes to show modus operandi and identity), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2197
(1977); United States v. Maestas, 546 F.2d 1177, 1181 (5th Cir. 1977) (evidence of prior
crimes to show identity); United States v. Largent, 545 F.2d 1039, 1043 (6th Cir. 1976)
(evidence of prior crimes to show intent), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1117 (1977); United States
v. Adderly, 529 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1976) (evidence of prior conviction to show in-
tent); United States-v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183, 1197 (5th Cir.) (evidence of prior
conviction to show intent), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); United States v. Cavallino, 498
F.2d 1200, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1974) (evidence of prior crimes to show modus operandi and
identity); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 133-36 (4th Cir. 1973) (evidence of prior
crimes to show modus operandi, identity, and corpus delicti), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974);
United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1973) (statement of general rule).
118 See United States v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 64, 68 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant raised
entrapment defense against charges of possession and distribution of heroin; evidence that
defendant had previously distributed cocaine held relevant to show predisposition and in-
tent); United States v. McFadyen-Snider, 552 F.2d 1178, 1182-84 (6th Cir. 1977) (evidence
of defendanes prostitution and passing of bad checks unrelated to charges of mail fraud
and false statements); United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Jardan, 552 F.2d 216, 218-19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2982 (1977); United
States v. Adderly, 529 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Arteaga-Limones,
529 F.2d 1183, 1197 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976).
'
1 9 See United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364, 1372 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d
1183, 1197 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976).
120 See United States v. Beechum, 555 F.2d 487, 493 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
McFadyen-Snider, 552 F.2d 1178, 1182-84 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Myers, 550
F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. James, 555 F.2d 992, 998-1001 (D.C. Cir.
1977); United States v. Nolan, 551 F.2d 266, 271 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Jardan,
552 F.2d 216, 218-19 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2982 (1977); United States v. Adderly,
529 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183, 1197
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A. Permissible Inferences
This Article suggests that the jury may properly draw an in-
ference of consent directly from the victim's specific prior acts.
Wigmore insists that prior similar behavior by itself is irrelevant
and confusing when offered as direct proof of an ultimate issue;
prior acts, if admissible at all, are relevant only to show the
witness's character or disposition, from which an inference as to
present behavior may be drawn. Reasoning that human action is
infinitely variable, Wigmore concludes that a past act is not proba-
tive of whether the act was done on the occasion in question. 2 '
Wigmore's exaggerated fear that women falsely accuse men of
sexual abuse led him to disregard his own notions of relevance. 122
In rape cases, he would admit evidence of dissimilar prior acts as
well as reputation through the medium of the character-disposition
concept.12 3 In effect he thus ignored his own reasoning that an act
done once will not necessarily be repeated. Wigmore not only ma-
nipulated the character concept, he carried it to an extreme. Courts
had found the victim's character only circumstantially relevant on
the question of consent, 124 and wholly irrelevant when consent was
not an issue.' 2 5 Yet Wigmore insisted that character evidence was
admissible against the complainant even in cases of attempted
rape and indecent assault, where consent is not an issue.' 26
Wigmore's interposition of character between behavior and
consent ignores many instances in which prior similar conduct or
occurrences may legitimately provide a basis for inferring an ulti-
mate or necessary fact.127 To be sure, similar behavior in and of
itself has no probative value without a specific showing of rele-
vance.128 Evidence of prior acts may be relevant to questions of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, accident, modus operandi, existence of defect,
duty to repair, ownership, agency, business practice, or habit. 129 If
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
121 See 1 WIGMORE § 192.
122 See id. § 62. See also 3A WIGMORE § 924a.
12 See 1 WIGMORE §§ 62, 200.
124 See id.; MCCORMICK §§ 186, 188; Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 404.
125 See I WIGMORE § 200.
126 See id. § 62, at 466-67.
127 See MCCORMICK §§ 189-190, 195, 200; Slough & Knightly, supra note 11, at 326-36.
12
' See Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvID. 401.
12' See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); MCCORMICK §§ 190, 195, 200, 201; 1 WIGMORE § 217;
Slough & Knightly, supra note 11, at 328-33. See generally cases cited in notes 116-20 supra.
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one of these is a material question in the case, proof of prior
similar acts or occurrences may be admissible without regard to
character at all. 130 Moreover, a strict limitation on the admissibility
of similar-act evidence to these specific purposes has been criti-
cized as spurious.' 31
The approach suggested here will limit admissibility to evi-
dence demonstrably related to the conduct presently under inves-
tigation--i.e., past conduct occurring under circumstances sub-
stantially similar to those of the alleged rape. This view comports
with longstanding evidentiary principles. For example, if the pros-
ecution seeks to prove that robbery defendant X is the same person
who robbed others under similar circumstances, the prior acts may
be offered to show a modus operandi pointing to identity. 132 Evi-
dence of the prior robberies should be admissible only if there is
clear and convincing proof that X committed the robberies and that
the method was nearly identical to the circumstances of the present
case. 133 This reasoning allows the factfinder to draw an inference
of present conduct directly from past acts.
When the prosecution seeks to introduce evidence of a de-
fendant's prior acts under Federal Rule 404(b), courts generally
apply a five-pronged test; the evidence is admitted only if (1) there
is a clear showing that the defendant committed the prior acts; (2)
the circumstances of the prior acts closely resemble those of the
present case; (3) the prior acts are clearly relevant to a material
issue, such as identity or intent; (4) the evidence is necessary to the
prosecution's case; and (5) the probative value of the evidence out-
weighs its prejudicial effects. 134
As applied to rape cases, the requirement that convincing
proof link the complainant with the prior acts would eliminate the
use of reputation evidence, since reputation proves nothing about
130 The language of Rule 404(b) makes clear that the concepts involved are not char-
acter-based. See FED. R. Evso. 404(b) & Advisory Committee's Note.
131 See United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
979 (1974); McCoRMICK § 190, at 448, 453; Slough & Knighdy, supra note 11, at 326-27;
Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REv. 988 (1938).
182 See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1045.(5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Davis, 551 F.2d 233, 234 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2197 (1977); United States v.
Cavallino, 498 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir. 1974).
233 See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044-48 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Davis, 551 F.2d 233, 234-35 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2197 (1977); United States v.
Cavallino, 498 F.2d 1200, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1974).
134 See cases cited in notes 116-20 supra.
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the details of prior conduct. 135 The second and third require-
ments-by admitting only clearly related conduct relevant to the
issue of consent-would exclude confusing and prejudicial evi-
dence of prior dissimilar conduct; under these requirements, the
rejection of prior acts that are too remote would insure that evi-
dence of prior conduct is both reliable and relevant to the recent
events in issue. The necessity test would force the court to consider
the merits of the consent defense itself, and would end the practice
of judges who abuse their discretion by admitting sexual history
evidence even when the use of overwhelming force has been clear-
ly demonstrated. 136 Finally, the requirement that probative value
outweigh prejudice would eliminate questioning designed prima-
rily to harass the complainant or to arouse the jury's sentiments
against her.
A sixth requirement should be added, however, which derives
at least in part from Wigmore's logic: A single past act is not proba-
tive of present acts; only related patterns of behavior should be
admissible.' 37 This requirement provides added assurance of relia-
131 See notes 70-76 and accompanying text supra.
136 See, e.g., Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1953) (exclusion of
evidence of complainant's prior cohabitation with man other than defendant held prejudi-
cial error despite proof of physical injury resulting from attack); Teague v. State, 208 Ga.
459, 67 S.E.2d 467 (1951) (evidence of complainant's reputation for lewdness admitted
despite evidence of physical injury); People v. Crego, 70 Mich. 319, 38 N.W. 281 (1888)
(jury instructed to consider woman's prior sexual conduct despite testimony that defendant
struck her to make her lie still); State v. Satchell, 17 N.C. App. 312, 194 S.E.2d 51 (1973)
(questioning of complainant on "whether she had ever had intercourse with another male"
held permissible, despite proof of complainant's injuries and obvious signs of violence at
scene of alleged rape); Guy v. State, 443 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn. Grim. App. 1969) (defendant
allowed to question victim on specific relations with other men, despite evidence that de-
fendant knocked her down and forced her to submit to defendant and four other men).
For a better decision, see State v. Warford, 293 Minn. 339, 200 N.W.2d 301, cert. denied,
410 U.S. 935 (1972). In Warford, the court held that "when consent is not a serious issue,
the corroborating evidence is strong, and the victim's chastity is not raised as part of the
prosecution's case," cross-examination of the victim regarding her prior unrelated sexual
conduct is improper. 293 Minn. at 341-42, 200 N.W.2d at 303. Although it did not decide
the question, the court noted that under these circumstances the evidence might also be
inadmissible as part of the defendant's case-in-chief. Id. at 342 n.2, 200 N.W.2d at 303 n.2.
Even when the use of force is conceded, the defense may raise the issue of consent to
introduce evidence of the victim's chastity, hoping that the jury will try the victim rather
than the defendant. See Berger, supra note 6, at 30-31; Fallacy, supra note 9, at 160. Kalven
and Zeisel found that in 12% of the cases sampled involving charges of "aggravated rape"
(defined as rape in which there was evidence of violence or multiple assailants, or in which
defendant and victim were complete strangers), the jury acquitted when the judge would
have convicted. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 252-53 (1971).13 7 See text accompanying note 121 supra. Cf. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127,
133 (4th Cir. 1973) (evidence of repeated "accidents" especially relevant to prove infan-
ticide), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
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bility, and strengthens the permissible inference that prior consent
was repeated on the present occasion.
Other rules of evidence recognize the importance of establish-
ing similarity between past and present acts. Although propensity
evidence is generally inadmissible when offered to show a defen-
dant's predisposition to commit a crime, 138 in one class of cases
propensity is relevant in and of itself. Where entrapment is a de-
fense, the prosecution may rebut by showing that the defendant
was predisposed to commit the crime.' 39 Nonetheless, evidence of
general criminal propensity is inadmissible even in entrapment
cases.' 40 The evidence of prior acts must show the defendant's
readiness to commit the specific type of crime with which he is
charged. 14
1
In rape cases, under Wignore's rule, the complainant does
not receive similar consideration. A single act of nonmarital inter-
course, even if unrelated to the present charge, could suffice to
establish a disposition for unchastity. It would thus be admissible
to prove consent.
B. Similarity of Circumstance
General evidentiary doctrine admits evidence of prior acts only
if the circumstances of the prior acts closely resemble the event in
issue.' 42 Although evidence of the defendant's sexual history may be
excluded in rape cases because of its potential prejudicial effect,
143
when it relates to the defendant's prior similar and unusual rela-
tions with the victim, some courts have admitted the evidence
because its high probative value outweighs the possibility of prej-
udice.' 44 Such proof may be described as showing a special disposi-
tion toward the present victim,'145 a character concept. However,
138 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); United States v.
Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977); FED. R. EvID. 404(b); MCoIICK § 190; 1
WIGMORE § 194; Slough & Knightly, supra note 11, at 326, 332 & n.38.
139See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
140 See United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1973).
141 See United States v. Brown, 453 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978
(1972).
142 See cases cited in note 117 supra.
143 See, e.g., People v. Greer, 49 App. Div. 2d 297, 303-04, 374 N.Y.S.2d 224, 230-31
(4th Dep't 1975).
144 See 2 WIGMORE § 402; Slough & Knightly, supra note 11, at 333-34.
14 5 See 2 WIGMORE § 402, at 370; Slough & Knightly, supra note 11, at 334. See generally
Commonwealth v. Kline, 361 Pa. 434, 443, 65 A.2d 348, 351-52 (1949).
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this evidence resembles more closely proof of modus operandi and
the like, concepts unrelated to character.146
Another analogy can be found in habit cases. Evidence of a
regular practice, routine, or "habit" is admissible to show that the
particular act in issue occurred under similar circumstances. 147 The
requirement of invariable regularity severely limits admissibility. 48
Only evidence of a pattern of conduct, rather than isolated in-
stances of prior action, will satisfy the standard. 49
In civil actions, courts usually exclude evidence of prior con-
duct to show present negligence.' 50 However, when the prior con-
duct took place under circumstances closely related to the present
situation, the evidence may be admissible on questions of knowl-
edge, duty to repair, foreseeability, objective condition of danger,
and even proximate cause. 151
Admitting evidence of prior acts or occurrences carries sub-
stantial risks of jury prejudice and confusion. 52 Thus, courts
must first weigh its probative value against its prejudicial effect.' 53
Such balancing is necessary when the evidence is offered to im-
peach credibility; 154 similar principles should also apply when the
evidence is offered as part of the case-in-chief.' 55 Federal Rules
608 and 609 contain the balancing principles applicable to im-
peachment. The Rules encourage defendants or other witnesses
to testify by reducing the risk of undue harassment and humilia-
tion from cross-examination based upon prior conduct unrelated
to the witness's present credibility. 156
The same policy underlies recent state legislation that severely
restricts the admissibility of evidence of sexual history, 57 thereby
146 See notes 129-30 and accompanying text supra.
147 See FED. R. EvID. 406; MCCORMICK § 195; 1 WIGMORE § 92.
4I See, e.g., Baldridge v. Matthews, 378 Pa. 566, 570, 106 A.2d 809, 811 (1954); 1
WIGMORE § 92.
14 9 See Strauss v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 404 F.2d 1152, 1158 (2d Cir. 1968); McCoR-
MICK § 195; 1 WIGMORE § 92.
'50 McCoRMICK § 189, at 446; 1 WIGMORE § 199, at 678.
151 See MCCORMICK § 200.
"I See Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 405; 1 WIGMORE § 29a.
1'3 See FED. R. EVID. 403; McCoRMICK § 190, at 453-54.
"'See People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 375, 314 N.E.2d 413, 414-15, 357 N.Y.S.2d
849, 853-54 (1974); FED. R. EvID. 608, 609. See generally MCCORMICK §§ 41-44.
155 See notes 99-101 and accompanying text supra.
15 See People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 375, 314 N.E.2d 413, 414-15, 357 N.Y.S.2d
849, 853-54 (1974); Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvID. 608. See also FED. R. EvD.
611 (a).
'
5 See note 6 supra.
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encouraging rape victims to come forward and testify.158 Indeed,
the commentary to the New York statute 159 specifies that the law is
to be interpreted in light of the balancing principles announced
by the Court of Appeals in People v. Sandoval,' 60 although language
in Sandoval limits its scope to attacks on the credibility of a de-
fendant. 6 '
What patterns of conduct are admissible on the issue of con-
sent? The new statutes uniformly admit evidence of the com-
plainant's prior sexual relations with the defendant. 62 Although
this evidence would probably pass the pattern-of-behavior test in
most cases,' 63 its admissibility is also justifiable on other grounds. A
past relationship between the victim and defendant may support
an inference of consent, even if the past conduct is dissimilar to
that at issue in the case. 164 Nevertheless, a marked disparity in
circumstances might render the evidence inadmissible-partic-
ularly in cases of proven force.
Admissibility of prior conduct should be determined by induc-
tive rather than deductive reasoning. This process would require
the trial court to weigh the victim's pattern of specific prior acts
against the circumstances of the present case. If there is a high
degree of similarity, the evidence would have substantial probative
value outweighing the risk to the victim of undue harassment or
humiliation. If the pattern of previous behavior is dissimilar, it
would lack probative value.
Thus, if the rape involved the use of physical force or multi-
ple attackers, 65 and the victim's pattern of conduct showed con-
158 See note 7 supra.
159 Bellacosa, Practice Commentary to N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42, at 101 (McKinney
Supp. 1976).
160 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974).
161 See id. at 373 & n.1, 314 N.E.2d at 415 & n.1, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 852 & n.1.
162See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(2)(b) (West Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 794.022(2) (West 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-32.5-2 (Burns Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.347(3)(c) (West Supp. 1976); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1976); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Page Supp. 1976); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1976); Berger, supra note 6, at 33.
163 See notes 134-37 and accompanying text supra.
164 See generally Berger, supra note 6, at 58-59. Cf. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d
1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1977) (complete identity of circumstances between defendant's prior
crimes and present charge not required for admissibility); Bradley v. United States, 433
F.2d 1113, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (prior crimes offered to show defendant's identity need
not "possess factual sameness in every detail").
165 See cases cited in note 136 supra.
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sent only with intimate friends, evidence of this prior conduct
would be irrelevant. Moreover, even if the pattern of conduct
showed consent with men other than close friends, but under cir-
cumstances substantially different from the incident in question,
probative value would still be minimal. On the other hand, if the
present case represented merely one more episode in a long his-
tory of promiscuity, evidence of this history would be admissible, 66
as would a peculiar pattern of behavior that shares the special or
distinguishing characteristics of the alleged rape. 67
C. A Case-by-Case Approach
In determining the admissibility of past-act evidence, a fixed
standard is neither necessary nor desirable. Human conduct defies
rigid compartmentalization. Courts should fix the requisite degree
of similarity between past and present circumstances on a case-by-
case basis.
Several recent decisions under the new state statutes may
prove helpful in charting these waters. In Huffman v. State,'168 the
rape defendant alleged consent. The defendant conceded that he
broke into the victim's house at night with intent to commit grand
larceny. To prove consent, and apparently to impeach the victim's
credibility, the defendant sought to inquire on cross-examination
into the victim's prior acts of intercourse with other men. Affirm-
ing the trial court's exclusion of this evidence, the appellate court
noted that, at most, it would permit evidence of "illicit relationships
166 See, e.g., People v. Bastian, 330 Mich. 456, 47 N.W.2d 692 (1951) (allowing both
cross-examination of complainant and expert testimony concerning complainant's nympho-
mania and "sexual psychopathic" personality); Lee v. State, 132 Tenn. 655, 179 S.W. 145
(1915) (evidence of complainant's intercourse with others, constituting recent habitual be-
havior, admissible on both consent and credibility).
Perhaps the classic illustration of a course of conduct constituting "promiscuity" ap-
pears in Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967), in which one of the defendants testified that,
prior to the alleged rape, the 16-year-old complainant had told the defendants that "she
had had relations with 16 or 17 boys that week and two or three more wouldn't make any
difference." Id. at 69. There was also evidence-allegedly suppressed by the prosecution
at trial-that the complainant had told a police officer that in the previous two years she
had engaged in sexual relations with "numerous boys and men, some of whom she did not
know." Id. at 71.
167 For example, if the victim regularly consented to sado-masochistic sex, which on
the present occasion allegedly resulted in rape, the pattern of prior sexual activity would
seem relevant to the issue of consent.
168 301 So. 2d 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
[Vol. 63:90
CHARACTER FOR CHASTITY
on the part of the prosecutrix sufficiently widespread to show a
pattern of conduct which would bear on the issue of consent.' '1 69
This decision conflicts directly with traditional authority which
would have admitted the evidence on the question of consent.'7 0
In State v. Hill,'7 ' the victim was dragged to the scene of the
rape and threatened with death. Arguing that the victim had con-
sented, the defendant offered to prove that the victim had engaged
in sexual relations with two boyfriends. The court held as a matter
of law that the "evidence of complainant's prior cohabitation with
two men did not have sufficient probative value in the context of
this case to permit its introduction on the issue of whether or not
she consented to sexual relations with this defendant."' 72 The
court also noted the contrast between the evidence of previous
cohabitation and the circumstances of the present case:
Isolated instances of cohabitation as distinguished from evi-
dence of promiscuity, do not in themselves lend credence to a
claim of consent such as defendant here raises. Accordingly, we
reject the contention that complainant's prior unchastity is ma-
terial to the question of whether she consented to a sexual en-
counter in a parking lot with a total stranger in the middle of the
night after an acquaintance of only momentary duration. 73
In drawing this contrast, Hill represents a significant departure
from case law broadly supporting the admissibility of sexual his-
tory evidence even though the use of force has been shown.17 4
The decisions in Huffrnan and Hill relating the victim's pattern
of behavior to the sexual act in issue accord with the analysis advo-
cated here. The results in these cases demonstrate that use of a
prior-similar-act analysis will limit rather than broaden the admis-
sibility of sexual history evidence on the issue of consent.
16 9 Id. at 817. Although the events in Huffman took place before Florida enacted its
statute limiting the admissibility of chastity evidence in rape cases, the court's analysis ac-
cords with that of the statute. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West 1976), quoted in rel-
evant part in note 6 supra.
170See, e.g., People v. Walker, 150 Cal. App. 2d 594, 310 P.2d 110 (1957); Campos v.
State, 122 Tex. Crim. 179, 356 S.W.2d 317 (1962).
171 244 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1065 (1977).
172 244 N.W.2d at 731.
1
73 Id.
174 See cases cited in note 136 supra.
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III
SEXUAL HISTORY AND CREDIBILITY-THE
PROPER PATH OF REFORM
A number of jurisdictions admit evidence of unchastity to im-
peach the complainant's credibility. 175 Wigmore assumed that un-
chaste women tend to make false and imaginary charges of sexual
abuse.' 76  He concluded therefore that evidence of unchastity
should be admissible to prove circumstantially the victim's bad
character for truth and veracity. 177
Summarizing Wigmore's position fails to impart the full flavor
of his hysteria. Although he admits the lack of relevance when
consent is not in issue, Wigmore concludes that "a certain type of
feminine character predisposes to imaginary or false charges of
this sort and is psychologically inseparable from a tendency to
make advances, and its admissibility to discredit credibility . . .
cannot in practice be distinguished from its present bearing."'' 7 8
Wigmore later states:
There is, however, at least one situation in which chastity may
have a direct connection with veracity, viz. when a woman or young
girl testifies as complainant against a man charged with a sexual
crime .... Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior
17 See, e.g., Brown v. State, 291 Ala. 789, 280 So. 2d 177 (1973); People v. Pantages,
212 Cal. 237, 297 P. 890 (1931); Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 90 S.E.2d 664 (1955); Redmon
v. State, 150 Neb. 62, 33 N.W.2d 349 (1948); State v. Cole, 20 N.C. App. 137, 201 S.E.2d
100 (1973); 3A WIGMORE § 924a. Cf. People v. Rowland, 262 Cal. App. 2d 790, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 269 (1968) (evidence of assault victim's homosexuality admissible to impeach credibil-
ity). Under the Federal Rules, impeachment evidence, other than evidence of prior convic-
tions (see FED. R. EvID. 609(a)), must refer specifically to the witness's character for truth
and veracity, rather than to other character "traits" such as unchastity. See FED. R. EvID.
608 & Advisory Committee's Note. But see notes 200-06 and accompanying text infra.
"'See 1 WIGMORE § 62; 3A WIGMORE § 924a; Berger, supra note 6, at 21-22. The
typical jury instruction on this subject appears in note 36 supra. In State v. Coella, 3 Wash.
99, 105-106, 28 P. 28, 29 (1891), the court observed that if a witness had admitted at trial
to being a prostitute, "[sihe could not have ruthlessly destroyed that quality upon which
most other good qualities are dependent, and for which, above all others, a woman is
reverenced and respected, and yet retain her credit for truthfulness unsmirched." In
Camp v. State, 3 Ga. 417, 422 (1847), the Georgia Supreme Court observed:
[N]o evil habitude of humanity so depraves the nature, so deadens the moral
sense, and obliterates the distinctions betweeen right and wrong, as common, licen-
tious indulgence. Particularly is this true of women, the citadel whose character is
virtue; when that is lost, all is gone; her love of justice, sense of character, and
regard for truth.
177 See 3A WIGNIORE § 924a.
178 1 WIGMORE § 62, at 467.
CHARACTER FOR CHASTITY
of errant young girls and women coming before the courts in all
sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes are multifarious, dis-
torted partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derange-
ments or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment,
partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions. One
form taken by these complexes is that of contriving false charges
of sexual offenses by men. The unchaste (let us call it) mentality
finds incidental but direct expression in the narration of imagi-
nary sex incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or the
victim.
1 7 9
Although Wigmore uses phrases that seem to limit the scope
of these passages--e.g., "errant young girls," "a certain type"--
other language in the same discussion broadens the class of pre-
sumed liars to include not only unchaste women but all women
who testify as complainants. Thus, Wigmore concludes: "No judge
should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the female com-
plainant's social history and mental makeup have been examined and testi-
fied to by a qualified physician."'80 The practical effect of Wigmore's
approach is to render the complainant's character the most prom-
inent issue in the case.
Given Wigmore's dogmatic conclusions regarding false charges
and the need for psychiatric examination, one would expect him to
produce a body of reputable authority to demonstrate that accusa-
tions of sexual abuse are false or imaginary in a substantial number
of cases. 8 ' In the current edition of his treatise, however, Wigmore
relies for the most part upon Ballard v. Superior Court, 8 2 the studies
cited in that case, and a few additional pieces of research to sup-
port his conclusions.' 8 3 Ballard, however, does not even support
the proposition for which Wigmore cites it, and itself relies in part
on an earlier edition of Wigmore's treatise.18 4
Wigmore cites the research of psychologists and social workers
179 3A WIGMORE § 924a, at 736 (emphasis in original).
180 Id. at 737 (emphasis in original).
181 On the contrary, in People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 119 (1975), the court recognized that "[t]he low rate of conviction of those accused
of rape and other sexual offenses does not appear to be attributable to a high incidence of
unwarranted accusations." Id. at 880, 538 P.2d at 258, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 130. "[T]hose who
make . . .accusations [of sexual crimes] should be deemed no more suspect in credibility
than any other class of complainants." Id. at 883, 538 P.2d at 260, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
182 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966).
18 See 3A WIGMOR § 924a, at 737 n.1. For a discussion of Wigmore's reliance on
doubtful and outdated psychological studies, see Berger, supra note 6, at 27 & n.168.
184 See 64 Cal. 2d at 171-77, 410 P.2d at 846-50, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 310-14.
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conducted between 1898 and 1933, quoting copiously from one
group of case studies which showed that several seriously disturbed
young women and girls had made false accusations of sexual
abuse. 185 Wigmore's authorities recount incidents of false accusa-
tion by girls in early adolescence or during menstrual disturb-
ances,18 6 by pathological liars,'8 7 and by a "hysterical sex delin-
quent."188 Largely on the basis of these abnormal and singular
examples, Wigmore ultimately concludes that all rape complainants
should be subjected to psychiatric examination; Ballard, however,
reached no such conclusion.' 89 It merely held that a trial court had
the power to order the complainant's psychiatric examination when
the defendant made a convincing showing of its necessity.' 90 Al-
though there is ample authority for this view,' 9 ' the decision in
Ballard hardly supports Wigmore's conclusion that courts should
require an examination in every case.
Several studies have addressed the question of false charges.
The studies fail to state how researchers determined that any par-
ticular charge was false. Nonetheless they provide support for sev-
eral interesting conclusions:
(1) Rape is one of the most under-reported crimes in the
United States; 92
(2) When the victim reports the rape to a male police officer,
185 W. HEALY & M. HEALY, PATHOLOGICAL LYING, ACCUSATION, AND SWINDLING 172-87,
195-97, 214-17 (1915), quoted in 3A WIGMORE § 924a, at 740-43.
186 W. HEALY & M. HEALY, supra note 185, at 162.
1 17 Id. at 172-87, 195-97, 214-17; E. SOUTHARD & M. JARRETT, THE KINGDOM OF EVILS
189-92 (1922), cited in 3A WIGNIORE § 924a, at 746 n.4.
188 E. SOUTHARD & M. JARRETT, supra note 187, at 69-80, cited in 3A WIGMORE § 924a,
at 746 n.4.
189 In response to Wigmore's view, the court stated:
We submit however, that a general rule requiring a psychiatric examination of
complaining witnesses in every sex case or, as an alternative, in any such case that
rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness would, in
many instances, not be necessary or appropriate. Moreover, victims of sex crimes
might be deterred by such an absolute requirement from disclosing such offenses.
64 Cal. 2d at 175-76, 410 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
190 Id. at 176-77, 410 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313. "Such necessity would generally
arise only if little or no corroboration supported the charge and if the defense raised the
issue of the effect of the complaining witness' mental or emotional condition upon her
veracity." Id. at 177, 410 P.2d at 849, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
191 See, e.g., People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 443 P.2d 794, 70 Cal. Rptr. 210 (outlin-
ing criteria for admissibility of psychiatric evidence obtained in Ballard examination), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 864 (1968). Accord, Mosley v. Commonwealth, 420 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1967);
State v. Clasey, 252 Or. 22, 446 P.2d 116 (1968). See generally Berger, supra note 6, at
68-69.
192 See M. AMIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 27-28 (1971); Berger, supra note 6, at 5.
[Vol. 63:90
CHARACTER FOR CHASTITY
the percentage of false charges-fifteen percent-is higher than
the average for other violent crimes;1 93"and
(3) When the victim makes her report to a female police of-
ficer, the incidence of false accusations-two percent-is precisely
the same as in all other cases of violent crime.' 94
With regard to false charges some other aspects of the crime
of rape warrant mention. A study of 646 cases of forcible rape in
Philadelphia conducted between 1958 and 1960 showed that 71%
of the rapes were fully planned and an additional 11% involved
some degree of planning.1 95 Moreover, 43% of the cases involved
more than one assailant. 196
Personality studies of rapists are also revealing. They demon-
strate that there are essentially five types of rapist: (1) the assaultive
rapist, who needs violence for sexual gratification; (2) the amoral
delinquent, who views women as objects expressly available for
his sexual use; (3) the drunken rapist, whose underlying hostile
impulses are released by intoxication; (4) the explosive rapist,
whose violence is inexplicable and often unpredictable; and (5) the
double-standard rapist, who sees two classes of women, good and
bad, the latter to be used for sexual gratification, forcibly if neces-
sary. 19 7
Although cases undoubtedly exist in which false accusations of
sexual abuse have resulted in conviction of an innocent defendant,
none of the studies to date has isolated a discrete category of con-
victed rapists that could be described as the falsely accused.
In summary, no evidence has been cited to support the as-
sumption that unchaste women are more likely to make false rape
accusations than chaste women. Since traditional theory proceeds
from the false premise that the unchaste place false charges, the
conclusion that unchastity supports an inference of bad character
for truth and veracity must fall.' 98 Wigmore's argument for the
admissibility of chastity evidence to impeach credibility seems to
193 S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 387 (1975).
194 Id.
195 M. AMIR, supra note 192, at 142. The Kinsey Institute has concluded that 70% of
all rapes are planned. J. CsIDA & J. CSIDA, RAPE: How To AvOID IT AND WHAT To Do
ABOUT IT IF YOU CAN'T 30 (1974).
196 M. AMIR, supra note 192, at 200.
197 See J. CSIDA & J. CSIDA, supra note 195, at 29-30; P. GEBHARD, J. GAGNON, W.
POMEROY, & C. CHRISTENSON, SEX OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF TYPES 197-205 (1965);
MacNamara, Sex Offenses and Sex Offenders, 376 ANNALS OF Am. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 148,
151-52 (1968).
198 See Berger, supra note 6, at 17, 55.
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rest on nothing more than moral bias.
The discussion thus far has centered on the specifics of
Wigmore's assumption that the unchaste place false charges. The
same view, however, raises a more technical evidentiary problem
involving the relationship between prior "bad acts" and character
for truthfulness, a subject lying at the heart of Federal Rule 608.199
Since the traditionalists' connection between unchastity and lack of
veracity is wholly unproven, Rule 608 should operate to exclude
cross-examination referring to lack of chastity.
Nevertheless, Wigmore's view continues to dominate the think-
ing of modern courts and commentators. In their discussion of
Rule 404(a)(2), Weinstein and Berger note that, contrary to Wig-
more,200 Rule 405 would exclude evidence of specific instances of
unchastity on the issue of consent.2 01 In a footnote to this discus-
sion, they also suggest that the assumption underlying Wigmore's
argument for the admissibility of such evidence to impeach cred-
ibility-i.e., that unchaste women are more likely than chaste wom-
en to make false accusations--"warrants some checking. '20 2 They
defend Rule 405's exclusion of specific acts, however, by noting
that "a fairly free attack" on the victim's credibility remains avail-
able under Rule 608.203 This Rule allows the cross-examiner to
inquire into specific instances of conduct, provided such conduct is
probative of the victim's character for truth and veracity.20 4 The
199 FED. R. EVID. 608 provides:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character.-The credibility of a witness may
be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but
subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truth-
fulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only
after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or
reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct.-Specific instances of the conduct of a witness,
for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of
crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They
may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or un-
truthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning
his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the
witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does
not operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined
with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
200 See 1 WIGMORE § 200, at 682-83.
201 2 WEINSTEIN 404[06], at 404-36.
2 02 1d. at 404-36 n.1.
203 Id. at 404-36.
204 FED. R. EvIn. 608(b). Under Rule 608(b), the defense may question the victim on
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Rule also permits an attack on credibility through the use of repu-
tation or opinion evidence offered to establish character for un-
truthfulness.0 5 Thus, despite their call for "checking," Weinstein
and Berger seem to accept Wigmore's conclusion that evidence of
the victim's unchastity may support the inference of poor cred-
ibility.20 6
A rejection of Wigmore's connection of unchastity with un-
truthfulness and an appreciation of current attitudes toward non-
marital sex materially alter the permissible scope of cross-examina-
tion. Since nonmarital intercourse per se is no longer "immoral, '2 °
it cannot be considered a "prior bad act" relevant to character for
truthfulness. 20 8 Furthermore, there is no empirical evidence link-
ing chastity and veracity. Thus the complainant's mere lack of chas-
tity should be irrelevant to credibility.20 9
Although the previous discussion demonstrates the inapplica-
bility of the character concept, it must be noted that cross-
examination is not limited to impeaching the credibility of the wit-
ness. Evidence adduced in cross-examination may be relevant to
the complainant's direct testimony on the issue of consent. 210
Pattern-of-behavior evidence demonstrably relevant to consent
might be relevant not only in challenging the complainant's
general credibility but in contradicting or clarifying specific ele-
ments of her direct testimony. In such cases, pattern-of-behavior
evidence should be received pursuant to proper safeguards. 211
Similarly, cross-examination may seek to impeach specific credi-
her specific "bad acts," but may not offer extrinsic evidence of such acts. See generally
United States v. Whiting, 311 F.2d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 1962); People v. Schwartzman, 24
N.Y.2d 241, 245, 247 N.E.2d 642, 644, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 821 (1969); People v. Sorge,
301 N.Y. 198, 201, 93 N.E.2d 637, 639 (1950). Rule 405(b), on the other hand, bars evi-
dence of specific acts on the question of consent, since the victim's character has only in-
ferential significance under Rule 404(a)(2). See note 63 and accompanying text supra. Thus,
although cross-examination concerning specific acts is permissible for purposes of impeach-
ment, extrinsic evidence of such acts is inadmissible with regard to both credibility and
consent.
205 FED. R. EvID. 608(a).
206 McCormick also relies upon Wigmore in this regard. See MCCORMICK § 44, at
92 n.2.
207 See notes 41-55 and accompanying text supra.208 See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
209 See McLean v. United States, 377 A.2d 74, 79 (D.C. 1977), quoted in note 76 supra.
211 See Note, supra note 7, at 1561-63. See generally MCCORMICK § 47, at 99.
211 This approach differs from the proposal in S. 1 (see note 5 supra), which would
have barred completely evidence of the victim's sexual history for purposes of impeachment.
"Proper safeguards" might call for the trial judge's initial review of the evidence in cam-
era or away from the hearing of the jury, and perhaps a written order specifying the man-
1977]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
bility by showing bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives.212 Where the
victim's prior sexual behavior is relevant to these issues such be-
havior provides a proper subject of cross-examination.
Thus, when pattern-of-behavior evidence satisfies the same
strict standards applicable when offered to prove consent, it should
also be relevant on cross-examination to test the truthfulness of
the complainant's direct testimony.
CONCLUSION
Courts should exclude evidence of the rape victim's sexual
history unless the evidence shows a pattern of sexual conduct so
closely related to the facts of the present case that the jury may
reasonably and directly infer consent or lack of credibility. Even if
courts find that the proffered evidence is relevant, they should
limit its presentation to evidence of patterns of specific similar acts.
Reputation or opinion evidence of the victim's unchastity, whether
offered to prove consent or lack of credibility, should be excluded
as inherently unreliable.
ner and extent to which any of the proffered evidence found admissible may be introduced
at trial. For a discussion of how the new state statutes employ such procedural devices, see
Berger, supra note 6, at 37-39.
212 See, e.g., Motley v. State, 207 Ala. 640, 640-41, 93 So. 508, 509 (1922) (evidence of
victim's prior relations with defendant); State v. Elijah, 206 Minn. 619, 621, 289 N.W. 575,
577 (1940) (same). Cf. McFarland v. United States, 174 F.2d 538, 539-40 (D.C. Cir. 1949)
(evidence of "illicit relationship" between witness and defendant in perjury trial admissible
to show bias); People v. Peters, 23 Cal. App. 3d 522, 532-33, 101 Cal. Rptr. 403, 409-10
(evidence of homosexual relationship between witness and defendant in conspiracy case ad-
missible to show bias), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). See generally MCCORMICK §§ 40, 47.
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